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[By John Ross, a free-lance journalist who has written on Mexican political and economic affairs for
many years.]
The Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR) and the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN)
are currently taking part in critical federal and local elections by trying to stay out of sight. In the
elections, scheduled for July 6, voters will select all 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 32
Senate seats, the mayor of Mexico City, and the governors of several states. Both the EPR and the
EZLN have fallen uncharacteristically silent during the election season. Except for one incident that
left four persons dead on May 24, EPR fighters have not attacked government troops in months.
The Zapatistas have been even more muted, issuing occasional communiques from their
headquarters in southeastern Chiapas, where they took up defensive positions in January, after
Zedillo reneged on an agreement that would have granted limited autonomy to Mexico's 56 Indian
groups. Even demonstrators in Mexico City have virtually abandoned the practice of chanting
Marcos's name as they march into the great central plaza known as the Zocalo. Indeed, with a few
weeks left until crucial mid-term balloting, activists in Mexico City and in the provinces are much
more focused on the electoral option for change than on the armed option. The guerrillas appear to
understand that this is not their moment and are lying low.
In March, the EPR declared a unilateral cease-fire in its undeclared war against the Zedillo
government, until after the July 6 elections. The EPR had decreed similar short-term cease-fires last
October and November prior to local elections in Guerrero, Hidalgo, and Mexico states. Since late
August, following an offensive that cost the lives of at least 20 rebels and security forces, the EPR
has concentrated its efforts on conducting "armed propaganda" meetings in dozens of Guerrero
and Oaxaca communities, but has avoided contact with the military. The recent shootout on May
24 appears to have been ignited when an army brigade inadvertently walked into an "armed
propaganda" meeting in Chilapa, Guerrero, an EPR stronghold not far from the state capital of
Chilpancingo. "The validity of the electoral form of struggle has not yet been exhausted," said EPR
leader Comandante Jose Arturo in an interview with La Jornada reporter Pepe Olmos.
Speaking from his remote hideaway in the Huasteca mountains, the EPR leader said Mexico's
much-questioned electoral process has actually aided the guerrillas. According to Jose Arturo,
"hundreds of fighters came to the armed movement" after massive fraud kept opposition candidate
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas from assuming the presidency in 1988. EPR seeks to counter PRI's "fearvote" strategy By declaring an election-time cease-fire, the EPR also seeks to counter the "fear vote,"
which was the most potent weapon of the governing Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in
the 1994 presidential elections. In that campaign, which followed months of instability, marked by
the Zapatista uprising and the assassination of PRI presidential hopeful Luis Donaldo Colosio, the
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PRI used public fears to give a landslide victory to Ernesto Zedillo, who at that time represented the
"stability" option. In 1997, the PRI -which has governed Mexico for 68 years appears to be using the
same tactics. With the mayoral election in Mexico City strongly favoring Cardenas of the centerleft Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD), the PRI is flooding the airwaves with desperate
warnings of doom if the opposition wins Mexico City and a majority in Congress. "You could lose
everything overnight: your job, your home, your family," says a radio advertisement promoting the
PRI.
To stimulate the scare vote, the PRI has attacked the PRD as the "party of violence," holding
Cardenas's party responsible for daily protests by disgruntled workers and farmers that tie up
Mexico City traffic and irritate motorists. However, the PRD has lost 500 of its members to political
conflict since Carlos Salinas de Gortari won the presidential election in 1988. "The PRD exchanges
blood for votes it wants martyrs," said the PRI's internal publication La Republica. EZLN remains
skeptical about electoral option Meantime, the EZLN the original target of the PRI's scare tactics
in the 1988 campaign has also stayed out of the electoral limelight. The EZLN rebels remain
pinned down by as many as 40,000 Mexican army troops, and efforts to revive peace talks with he
government broken off in September 1996 are thwarted by intransigence on both sides and by the
impending election.
Although the EZLN has regularly dismissed the viability of political parties, the Zapatistas
unofficially endorsed Cardenas in his failed 1994 presidential bid, even inviting him into their
encampment to campaign. In that election, the EZLN allowed voting booths to be installed in
jungle communities under their influence and encouraged their sympathizers to vote for the
PRD, particularly for gubernatorial candidate Amado Avendano. After a questionable victory by
PRI candidate Eduardo Robledo, the EZLN mobilized civic protests and momentarily seized 38
municipal offices. Zedillo eventually removed Robledo from his post, a gesture that brought the
EZLN to the bargaining table.
On the other hand, the 1994 electoral campaign soured the Zapatistas on the electoral option. During
Chiapas municipal elections in 1995, the EZLN instructed its supporters at the last minute to stay
away from the polls, a ploy that pulled the rug out from under PRD candidates, destroying the
party's chances to win many municipalities. This infuriated many PRD leaders. In fact, the fourth
Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, issued in January 1996, forbade Zapatistas from running
for public office. EZLN autonomy demands would bar political parties from running candidates in
elections in indigenous communities. Instead, the mechanism of "Uses and Customs" empowers a
community to select its own leaders by consensus, at a public assembly.
Zedillo's rejection of this principle was a precipitating factor in the EZLN's suspension of peace
talks. The government's refusal to comply with the terms of the agreement on indigenous rights and
culture, signed in February 1996, has further hardened the Zapatistas' attitude toward the voting
process. "Why should we participate in elections for a Congress that only does what the president
tells it to do?" asked Subcomandante Marcos in a communique issued last March. The question was
posed especially to the Comision de Concordia y Pacificacion (COCOPA), the legislative commission
that oversees the long-suspended talks. Juan Guerra, one of the PRD representatives on COCOPA,
said the government will have a difficult task convincing the EZLN to return to the negotiating table.
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"They have lost all confidence in the government's word," said Guerra. In addition, the death of
PRD Sen. Heberto Castillo, long-time leftist leader and COCOPA's bridge to the Zapatistas, seems
to have shipwrecked prospects for new talks any time soon. "The talks were buried with Heberto,"
said COCOPA member Jose Narro Cespedes of the Partido del Trabajo (PT).
The fate of COCOPA remains uncertain, since its members were appointed by the current Congress.
The new Congress that emerges in July must decide whether COCOPA will continue to exist.
Despite the bleak outlook for a resolution to the conflict in Chiapas, Zedillo has tried to persuade
the EZLN that he is prepared to resume talks when the Zapatistas are ready. As a concession, the
president met one of the EZLN's demands for returning to the peace talks by removing Marco
Antonio Bernal as chief negotiator. Bernal, a former guerrilla member, is now the PRI candidate for
senator from Tamaulipas state.
On the other hand, Bernal's replacement, Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, does not inspire much
confidence on the part of the Zapatistas. Coldwell, an ex-PRI governor of Quintana Roo, has also
served as tourism secretary and helped develop the resort of Cancun. EZLN-government talks on
hold until after election But no matter who is heading the government negotiating team, all bets for
resolution of the Chiapas conflict are off until well after the July 6 election. At that time, the power
balance in Mexico could be dramatically altered if the PRI loses its absolute majority in Congress to
the PRD and to the center-right Partido Accion Nacional (PAN). If the PRI fails to gain 42% of the 500
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, Zedillo will no longer have an automatic pass for his legislative
initiatives, an unprecedented dynamic in modern Mexican political life.
In such a political atmosphere, settlement with the Zapatistas could be brokered by the PRD,
depending on the percentage of seats the party wins in the Congress. The PRD's victory appears
particularly likely in the mayoral election in Mexico City, where Cardenas holds comfortable leads
over his rivals from the PRI and the PAN. If the PRD candidate wins the mayoral election in the
capital, some visionaries have even suggested the possibility of a Cardenas-Subcomandante Marcos
summit meeting in Mexico City. Even the EPR which has repeatedly discounted negotiations with
the PRI government and criticized the EZLN for participating in such talks indicated in a recent
communique that it might reconsider its intransigence should the PRD increase its influence in
government.

-- End --
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